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Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of 
Dependent Children in the Administration of the 
Criminal Justice System 
Tamar Lerer∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Hundreds of thousands of incarcerated persons are parents; in many instances, their 
incarceration has profound effects on their young children. Despite the predictable harm 
that the these children experience when their caretakers are incarcerated, the criminal 
justice system lacks a uniform, principled, and transparent way to consider their interests 
at critical stages in the process. 
 
In this Article, I argue that the interests of the children of incarcerated offenders should 
be considered and demonstrate how this can be done. The paper proceeds in three Parts. 
In the first Part, I explain why we should care about caretaker incarceration: it harms 
individual children, it may be criminogenic and therefore harm society in the future, and 
it disparately impacts children of color. These harms, I argue, threaten the very 
legitimacy of our criminal justice system and undermine our society’s liberal values. In 
the second Part, I make explicit the way in which these interests can be taken into 
account, by drawing on the experience of family law and the best interests of the child 
standard. In Part II, I also attempt to refine the category of “caretaker” offenders, who 
are the focus of this paper, with the help of the concept of a “psychological parent”—a 
person who fulfills a child’s physical and psychological needs on a continuous basis. 
Finally, I put this standard into use in three contexts that incarcerated caretakers face—
bail, sentencing, and visitation policies—and show how consideration of the interests of 
children can be easily inserted into already existing balancing tests. By building upon 
these tests, we can create formal protections to help structure the use of prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mary is thirty-five years old and lives in Georgia.1 She is the mother of three 
children, who all live with her. Their father does not live with them, and he pays child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Georgia was selected because it allows us to see many of the typical issues that can occur in many states 
around the country; in this way, it was selected because it is typical, not because it is outstanding. Georgia 
bans gay marriage, so if one member of a gay couple raising children were to be arrested, the other would 
have problems accessing the benefits, such as visitation in prison and automatic custody of their children 
available to heterosexual married couples. See Georgia Constitutional Amendment 1, 2004 (now Ga. Const. 
art. I, § 4, ¶ I (2011)). Thirty-five other states have statutes or constitutional amendments restricting 
recognition of same-sex relationships. Marriage and Relationship Recognition Laws, MOVEMENT 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap. org/equality-maps/marriage_relationship_laws. The 
availability of second-parent adoption is uncertain, heightening this issue. See Bates v. Bates, 730 S.E.2d 
482, 486 (2012), reconsideration denied (July 31, 2012), cert. denied (Mar. 25, 2013) (holding second-
parent adoption on the basis of res judicata but “decid[ing] nothing in this case about whether Georgia law 
permits a ‘second parent’ adoption”).Without second-parent adoption, the non-biological parent may not be 
able to exercise any legal rights over her child, even as simple as signing a permission slip for a school trip, 
were the biological parent to be incarcerated. Second-parent adoption is allowed in 13 states and the 
District of Columbia, restricted in seven states, and uncertain in 30. Foster and Adoption Laws, MOVEMENT 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/foster_and_adoption_laws.  
In terms of criminal justice policy, Georgia has harsh drug laws and sentencing; though those laws are in 
line with the United States’ general policies. For instance, the average Georgian inmate released in 2009 on 
a drug possession charge spent 21 months behind bars. Bill Rankin & Carrie Teegardin, A Billion-Dollar 
Burden or Justice?, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (May 23, 2010), http://www.ajc.com/news/ 
news/local-govt-politics/a-billion-dollar-burden-or-justice/nQgFp/. Similarly, the average state sentence for 
felony drug possession nationwide was 23 months in 2006. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY 
SENTENCES IN 2006, tbl. 1.3 (Dec. 2009). All possession of marijuana is a criminal offense in Georgia, with 
all but first-time possession of less than one ounce a felony. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-2, 30 (West 2012). 
This comports with the rest of the country; possession of any amount of marijuana is criminalized in 33 




support intermittently. She has a great relationship with her children who excel in school 
and are very well-behaved. Mary has been supporting her three children economically as 
well as providing the children with emotional support—taking her asthmatic middle child 
to and from doctors’ appointments, attending meetings with her eldest child’s teacher 
about the bullying he is experiencing at school, preparing food for all of them, and 
tucking them in at night. In order to support them, she works seventy-hour weeks 
between two different restaurants. She sometimes also sells small quantities of marijuana 
to other adults.  
 One night, while she is on her way home, Mary is pulled over for making an 
incomplete stop at a stop sign. The police officer who pulls her over has a drug-sniffing 
dog with him, who alerts at her car. The police officer finds a bag with marijuana in it. 
Mary is arrested and brought to the local jail. She is charged with possession of narcotics 
with intent to distribute.  
 What is Mary’s trip through the criminal justice system going to look like for her 
and her family? Certainly, each procedural step—including bail, sentencing, and 
visitation policies at the correctional facility where she is sent—will affect her ability to 
provide care for her children. And yet, at each step, consideration of Mary’s children will 
be almost entirely non-existent. At ages thirteen, seven, and two, they are each in a 
different stage of development with accordingly different needs and capacities. 
Unfortunately, none of these needs will be considered in any formalized way. 
The criminal justice system rips families apart and deprives children from those 
who provide them financial and emotional care. It does not consider the effects of such 
incarceration on children or the net societal gain or loss from this incarceration. Although 
it is easy to understand that certain violent individuals should be incapacitated to protect 
their children as well as society, it is harder to believe that children of low-level, non-
violent offenders are truly better off without their caretakers. Mary is a particularly 
sympathetic defendant, but she is not unusual. Almost three-quarters of mothers in state 
correctional facilities in 2004 were incarcerated for non-violent offenses.2 What is 
missing from Mary’s story is that no one ever asked if her children would be better off 
without her.  
In this Article, I first argue that the interests of the children of incarcerated 
offenders should be considered in decisions affecting such offenders—including bail, 
sentencing, and visitation rights hearings—and second, demonstrate how this can be 
done. The paper proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I explain why we should care about 
caretaker incarceration: it harms individual children, it may be criminogenic and 
therefore harm society in the future, and it disparately impacts children of color. These 
harms, I argue, threaten the very legitimacy of our criminal justice system and undermine 
our society’s liberal values. In Part II, I make explicit the way in which these interests can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
states. Zach Howard, Vermont Moves Towards Decriminalizing Small Amounts of Marijuana, REUTERS 
(May 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE94C0VZ20130513. Despite the typical 
nature of these aspects of drug law and sentencing, Georgia is outstanding in regards to the proportion of 
the population behind bars. At the end of 2007, Georgia had the fourth highest incarceration rate in the 
country. SPECIAL COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS 7 (2011). 
2 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 4 (2008) available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. See Part I, infra, for more statistics on the population of 
parents within the prison system. 




be taken into account by drawing on the experience of family law and the best interests of 
the child standard. I also attempt to refine the category of “caretaker” offenders who are 
the focus of this paper, taking guidance from the concept of a “psychological parent,” a 
person who fulfills a child’s physical and psychological needs on a continuous basis. 
Finally, in Part III, I put this standard into use in three contexts that incarcerated 
caretakers face—bail, sentencing, and visitation policies—and show how consideration 
of the interests of children can be easily inserted into already existing balancing tests. By 
building upon these tests, we can create formal protections to help structure the use of 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion. In this way, the paper proceeds from describing the 
problem of caretaker incarceration, to proposing a solution to this problem, to applying 
the proposed solution, and finally, to responding to criticisms of this application.  
The most immediate criticism against accounting for the interests of offenders’ 
children during the sentencing process is that such consideration violates the traditional 
intent and purpose of criminal law. Traditionally, criminal law has four purposes: 
retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.3 It is considered axiomatic that 
the needs of third persons should have no relevance in these determinations. This 
traditional view of the purpose of criminal law is inaccurate. Criminal law already 
accounts for a broad range of third parties. Considering the best interests of the children 
of incarcerated caretakers is in no way a radical departure from the criminal justice 
system we already have in place. Those who believe that third-party interests should 
never be taken into account in these situations must undertake an overhaul of the system 
as it exists now.  
Generally, consideration of the interests of children is not foreign to the law; other 
fields of the law have developed mechanisms and principles with which to care for the 
interests of children. Most relevant to the purposes of this paper, family law insists on 
legal consideration of children’s needs and devotes huge amounts of judicial time to these 
needs in custody cases, neglect and abuses cases, and many other proceedings. The 
standards used in family law could be adapted for use in criminal procedure and thereby 
transform sentencing, bail, and prison visitation determinations into canonical occasions 
in which the law considers children’s interests. This Article argues for consideration 
before the foreseeable harm to the children of incarcerated caretakers occurs and 
demands consideration by legal actors in the criminal justice system, not just in the 
parallel family law proceedings that inevitably occur when incarceration disrupts family 
life. 
I. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT CARETAKER INCARCERATION? 
Before understanding how we should implement reforms in caretaker criminal 
procedure, we need a normative account for why we as a society should care about 
caretaker incarceration. Part I.A revisits Mary’s story to demonstrate how a caretaker and 
her children might experience the criminal justice system. Parts I.B and I.C explore the 
harms that caretaker incarceration visits upon children, with emphasis on the negative life 
outcomes of children of incarcerated parents, the criminogenic effects of caretaker 
incarceration, and the racial disparity in those most harmed by such incarceration. Part 
I.C additionally seeks to explain why these effects threaten one of liberalism’s core 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See text accompanying notes 170 and 172, infra. 




tenets: equality of opportunity. Based on these foundations, Part II seeks to determine the 
capacity of the law and its institutions to consider the harms visited upon children by 
caretaker incarceration. 
A. Mary’s Story 
From the moment of her arrest, officials of the justice system will make a series of 
determinations concerning Mary that will profoundly affect her children, yet it is likely 
these officials will hardly consider the interests of her children at any single decision 
point. After being arrested, Mary will appear before a judge who will decide whether she 
should be released on bail and, if so, how high that bail should be set. In Georgia, a state 
with relatively standard criminal procedures as compared to other states, the judge who 
sets bail must consider whether Mary poses a significant risk of: 1) fleeing from the 
jurisdiction of the court or failing to appear in court when required; 2) threat or danger to 
any person, to the community, or to any property in the community; 3) committing any 
felony pending trial; and 4) of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the 
administration of justice.4 It is possible Mary’s lawyer will present evidence of her 
caretaking responsibilities to the judge,5 and it is possible the judge will note such 
responsibilities in assessing whether Mary poses these risks. It is also possible that the 
judge will not.  
At sentencing, the judge is to consider “all aspects of the crime, the past criminal 
record or lack thereof, and the defendant's general moral character [as well as] [a]ny 
lawful evidence which tends to show the motive of the defendant, [her] lack of remorse, 
[her] general moral character, and [her] predisposition to commit other crimes.”6 As with 
bail, perhaps the finder of fact may deem Mary’s family caretaking responsibilities 
relevant. But perhaps she does not. Perhaps Mary is one of the lucky offenders who is 
sent to a diversionary drug court and avoids jail time, and perhaps she is not. If Mary 
goes to jail, her children might be sent to live with relatives or friends. If Mary is not 
lucky enough to have such a network, her children will go to foster care. If her children 
are in foster care for fifteen in the next twenty-two months, the state is required to move 
to terminate her parental rights.7  
Mary is sent to one of the three women’s prisons in Georgia, more likely than not 
over 100 miles from home.8 The distance makes it quite difficult to visit. Further, because 
visitation is considered a “privilege and not a right,” the Georgia Department of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (West 2013). 
5 See Howard v. State, 399 S.E.2d 283, 283 (Ga. App. 1990) (“At a bond hearing, evidence was also 
presented that defendant was 50 years old, married, with three children, had lived most of his life in the 
area, and had never been convicted of any crime.”). 
6 Ansley v. State, 399 S.E.2d 558, 559 (1990). 
7 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 103(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(E) (2006). The Georgia statute for 
terminating parental rights considers that such an order terminates all the parent’s rights and obligations 
with respect to the child, removes any notice entitlement the parent had to adoption proceedings, has no 
time limit regarding duration, and does not currently contemplate any procedures for reinstating such 
rights. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-93 (West 2013). 
8 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000) at 5 (reporting 
that 62% of state prisoners are being held in facilities over 100 miles from home; 84% of federal prisoners 
are over 100 miles from home, with an astounding 43.4% of total federal prisoners being housed over 500 
miles from home). 




Corrections can bar Mary’s family from visiting her for minor disciplinary infractions.9 
That will only be a problem, however, if Mary’s children move into the care of someone 
who is able and willing to take them to visit their mother. Eleven percent of minor 
children whose mothers are in jail end up in foster care, compared to a little over two 
percent of those children whose fathers are in jail. This is largely because only 37% of 
minor children whose mothers are incarcerated are taken care of by their fathers, as 
compared to the 88.4% of children of incarcerated fathers who live with their mothers.10 
If none of Mary’s relatives can care for her children, or if the department of child services 
or family court does not find the relatives to be fit caretakers, then the children will end 
up in foster care, perhaps together, and perhaps not.  
Why are the best interests of Mary’s children hardly considered by any of the 
actors in the criminal justice system? Unfortunately, the traditional philosophies 
regarding criminal punishment—retributive and utilitarian—limit our understanding of 
what role the system already plays in the lives of third parties and what role the system 
can and should play. These actors may or may not consider the children’s interests, but 
even in the best case, the children’s interests will be considered ad hoc by actors with no 
training in child development. Despite this misalignment, 53.3% of prisoners are parents 
of minor children; therefore, the criminal justice system is essentially ignoring the 
interests of an estimated 1,706,600 children.11 Lest one assume these prisoners were not 
“involved” parents, it is important to note that in 2004, almost half of state prisoners 
reported living with their minor children in the month before arrest or just prior to 
incarceration.12 Further, this number is likely both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-
inclusive because it includes some parents who are not involved in their child’s life at all 
but retain parental rights under law, such as estranged fathers. It is simultaneously under-
inclusive because it fails to include non-parents and non-guardians who, while not natural 
parents, are nonetheless important caretakers in the lives of children.13  
B. Who Is in Prison, and Who Are Their Children? 
 In order to determine the scope of the problem, this Part lays out the current state 
of parental incarceration.14 Unfortunately, statistics regarding the effects of mass 
incarceration on children remain hard to find. Research on the effects of mass 
incarceration on children largely examines parental incarceration rather than the children 
themselves. However, this information is critical because without understanding the 
scope and breadth of parental incarceration and its effects, we cannot accurately gauge 
the necessary response.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Georgia Department of Corrections, Standard Operating Procedures, Reference Number IIB01-0005 at 
18. 
10 PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 5. 
11 PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 1. Fifty-two percent of state inmates 
and 63% of federal inmates reported having children. Id. Although it is purely speculative to imagine what 
impact the interests of the child would have in the sentencing of these cases, it remains true that those 
interests are not systematically, transparently, and evenly considered by courts in these cases. 
12 Id. at 4. 
13 For a discussion on determining whose children actually rely upon for their general well-being, that is, 
who their caretakers are, see Part II.B.i, infra. 
14 PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, supra note 2.  




Hundreds of thousands of incarcerated persons are parents, and in many instances, 
their incarceration has profound effects on their young children. In 2007, 1,518,535 
people were held in American prisons.15 An estimated 809,800 of these prisoners, or 
53.3%, were parents of minor children.16 Prisoners have an estimated 1,706,600 minor 
children, which accounts for 2.3% of the U.S. resident population under age eighteen.17 
Fifty percent of these children are under the age of ten.18 Female prisoners are more 
likely than male prisoners to be parents with 61.7% of female and 51.2% of male 
prisoners being parents.19 Furthermore, many of these parents are not violent offenders. 
Among male prisoners, public-order and drug offenders are more likely to be parents than 
violent and property offenders.20 Similarly, among state female prisoners, violent 
offenders were least likely to be parents.21 Of incarcerated fathers, 45.2% were 
incarcerated for a violent offense, 23.9% for a drug offense, 17% for a property offense, 
and 13.9% on a public order offense.22 Of incarcerated mothers in state prisons, 31.2% 
were jailed for drug offenses, 30% for property offenses, 27.5% for violent offenses, and 
11.2% for public order offenses.23 Thus, hundreds of thousands of children experience 
the incarceration of a parent arrested for something other than a violent crime. 
C. The Negative Effects of Parental Incarceration 
1. Harm to Individual Children 
Interest in the effect of parental incarceration on children is a relatively recent 
phenomenon; for this reason, some criminologists have referred to children as the 
“invisible” victims of mass incarceration.24 Because of this, there is a lack of rigorous 
studies and reliable data about this population. But despite the lack of research, 
policymakers often assume that parental incarceration harms children. Congress 
recognized in the Second Chance Act of 2004 that “[t]he long-term generational effects 
of a social structure in which imprisonment is the norm and law-abiding role models are 
absent are difficult to measure but undoubtedly exist.”25 The Family Unity Demonstration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. at 1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. The percentage varies dramatically based on race. For instance, black children (6.7%) were seven and 
a half times more likely than white children (0.9%) to have a parent in prison. The racial disparity in 
parental incarceration will be discussed further in Part I.B.ii, infra. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 4. This is true for both state and federal male prisoners. 
21 Id. No patterns were discerned for female federal prisoners.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., Tanya Krupat, Invisibility and Children’s Rights: The Consequences of Parental Incarceration, 
29 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39 (2007); Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental 
Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME & JUST. 133, 134 (2008)(“Children of prisoners have been called the 
‘forgotten victims’ of crime, the ‘orphans of justice,’ the ‘hidden victims of imprisonment,’ ‘the Cinderella 
of penology’ and the ‘unseen victims of the prison boom’”) (internal citations omitted); CENTRE FOR 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: THE CHILDREN OF WOMEN IN 
PRISON (2004). 
25 S. Res. 2789, 108th Cong. (2004). 




Project, another congressional initiative, seeks to “alleviate the harm to children and 
primary caretaker parents caused by separation due to the incarceration of the parents.”26 
In many ways, parental incarceration is much like other parental loss, such as the 
death, divorce, or moving away of a parent.27 Children often experience the loss of a 
parent as a traumatic event, and trauma diverts children’s energy from developmental 
tasks, which may further result in delayed development, regression, or other maladaptive 
coping strategies.28 Children consequently suffer collateral harms from parental 
incarceration and the trauma it can create.29 Children find it even more difficult to cope in 
situations characterized by uncertainty, as is often the case with parental loss or 
incarceration. In those situations, children may not know who is to care for them, how 
long they will receive care, and when and if the missing parent will return. 30  
It could be, however, that parental incarceration wreaks a different degree of 
havoc on the lives of children. Research has found parental imprisonment to be a strong 
risk factor for antisocial behavior, future offending, mental health problems—including 
depression and anxiety—drug abuse, school failure, and unemployment. 31 Other issues 
specific to the incarceration of a caretaker, such as the stigma children face after a 
caretaker is incarcerated, are hard to quantitatively assess but have also been found to 
negatively impact children’s well-being.32 
Some carefully-crafted studies support the conclusion that paternal (as opposed to 
parental) incarceration has detrimental economic and psychological effects on many 
children. Though limited in its focus on fathers, this research implicates the general 
concerns of parental incarceration broadly. A meta-review of sociological data on 
parental incarceration by Professors Christopher Wildeman, Sara Wakefield, and Kristin 
Turney concluded that “paternal incarceration may have negative consequences for child 
well-being above and beyond paternal absence, at least for some vital outcomes.”33 
Another study has found that, across all age groups, paternal incarceration increases 
aggression, delinquency, anxiety, and depression in children.34  
Many studies suggest that the impact of maternal incarceration is different than that 
of paternal incarceration; though studies disagree as to whether the effects are more or 
less harmful for the children of incarcerated mothers.35 Any difference may be caused 
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partially by the fact that mothers are more often the children’s primary caretakers prior to 
incarceration. Over 55% of incarcerated women, as compared to 35.5% of men, reported 
living with their children in the month prior to arrest.36 Almost 42% of incarcerated 
mothers reported being the only parent in the household prior to incarceration, as 
compared to 17.2% of incarcerated fathers.37 This means that when a father is 
incarcerated, very often his child may have already been living with her mother, or may 
be able to move to her mother’s home. Over 88% of incarcerated fathers reported that 
their child at the time was living with the child’s mother, as opposed to 37% of 
incarcerated mothers reporting that their child at the time was living with the father.38 As 
a result, when a mother is incarcerated, children will much more often have to be cared 
for by a grandparent, a more distant relative, or friends or move in to foster care. This 
underscores an important point: although the living situations of some children prior to 
parental incarceration may not be ideal, the alternative living situation may well be 
worse. There is much evidence to suggest that the foster care system in the United States 
is deeply flawed,39 yet “parental bonds are blithely severed without checking to see if 
anything is substituted in their place.”40 Foster care is supposed to be a temporary 
placement for children but has become “a long-term state of uncertainty for many 
children,” with approximately 24,000 teenagers a year aging out of the system without 
ever being placed with a permanent family.41 One recent study concluded that there are 
“better outcomes when children on the margin of placement [in foster care] remain at 
home [with family].”42  
Parental incarceration also increases the economic burden on these children and 
their remaining caretakers, which likely leads to and exacerbates the negative impact of 
the trauma of separation itself. Prisoners cannot contribute financially to their children.43 
This is especially problematic given that about half of parents in state prison provided the 
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primary financial support for their minor children before they were incarcerated.44 
Childhood poverty is correlated with many adverse outcomes such as substandard 
housing, homelessness, inadequate nutrition and food insecurity, inadequate child care, 
lack of access to health care, living in unsafe neighborhoods, attending under-resourced 
schools, poor academic achievement, school dropout, abuse and neglect, behavioral and 
socio-emotional problems, physical health problems, and developmental delays.45  
The causal relationship between parental incarceration and adverse outcomes for 
children is complicated because it is hard to isolate the effects of incarceration from other 
kinds of disadvantage. Almost half of parents in prison report having had a close family 
member incarcerated, 56.5% report having mental health issues, and 67.4% report having 
a substance dependence or abuse problem.46 Over 63% of incarcerated parents reported 
earning less than $2,000 a month prior to incarceration.47 Yet, some studies show that 
parental imprisonment increases the risk of the negative developmental, psychological, 
health, and academic outcomes described above even when they control for parental 
criminality, low family income, poor parenting, and parental traits such as substance 
abuse and mental health issues.48  
We should not disregard the effect of these children’s parents’ incarceration 
simply because many of the children already live in fragile families. In fact, it should 
concern us even more; there is no reason to blithely heap additional difficulties upon 
children who were having difficulties before parental incarceration. In other words, 
parental incarceration “has the effect of additionally burdening already vulnerable 
children.”49 When considering the relative importance of this incarceration, we should 
recognize that for this already vulnerable population, “the increase in mental health 
problems reaches clinical levels.”50 
Lastly, parental incarceration can harm children’s emotional and intellectual 
development in ways that are hard to quantify. At its best, a family provides children with 
continuous care, which fosters emotional, moral, and intellectual growth and identity.51 
Parents, as the providers of this care, are necessary to serve these functions.52 If a parent 
who is able to provide such care is incarcerated and the child is placed with a person who 
is unable to provide such care, the child may suffer developmental and emotional harm. 
Whether or not a parent was in fact providing such care is, of course, a critical issue, and 
the following Part discusses methods for determining whether parents are providing this 
care. 
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2. The Disparate Impact on Minority Children 
Not all children are equally likely to experience the incarceration of a parent and 
its attendant adverse consequences. Mass incarceration disproportionately affects 
minority communities. Black Americans are more likely to go to jail than whites, and 
therefore, their children are more likely to be affected by this loss. This racial disparity 
compounds the threat to our society presented by parental incarceration. 
 One in 40 white children born in 1978 and 1 in 25 white children born in 1990 
had a parent in prison at some point in their lives. Conversely, 1 in 7 black children born 
in 1978 and 1 in 4 black children born in 1990 had a parent in prison.53 These disparate 
parental incarceration rates contribute to the disproportionate removal of black children 
from their parents’ custody to state control.54 Like many forms of childhood 
disadvantage, “parental imprisonment has emerged as a novel—and distinctively 
American—childhood risk that is concentrated among black children and children of 
low-education parents.”55 Given that parental incarceration has negative effects, and 
black children and other minority groups are more likely to experience these negative 
effects,56 parental incarceration exacerbates already existing racial inequalities.  
There is persuasive evidence to suggest that mass incarceration is criminogenic, 
or leads to more crime and criminality.57 Some sociologists have concluded that “[t]he 
experience of prison itself may increase the likelihood of reoffense postrelease.”58 This 
effect is attributed to the routinization and restriction of prison life and isolation from 
family, friends, and other social supports.59 Further, the inability of a released inmate to 
find a place to live and gainful employment results in the inmate having little access to 
legitimate work, which can lead to a return towards criminal behavior.60 Additionally, 
criminologists have found that the incarceration and release of prisoners “may disrupt the 
social networks of a community by affecting family formation, reducing informal control 
of children and income ties to families, and lessening ties among residents. These factors, 
which lead to neighborhood instability and low informal social control, have been linked 
to higher crimes rates.”61 Community vulnerability and incarceration combine to create 
negative feedback loops of increased crime by increasing “the spatial concentration of 
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disadvantage.”62 In sum, mass incarceration, as a whole, breeds further crime in the 
communities it disproportionally affects: “Every family, every household, every 
individual in these neighborhoods has direct personal knowledge of the prison. . . . 
Imprisonment ceases to be the fate of a few criminal individuals and becomes a shaping 
institution for whole sectors of the population.”63 The data above suggests that parental 
incarceration, as part of mass incarceration, may harm children by increasing crime in 
their own neighborhoods, another result that disproportionately affects minority children. 
3. Parental Incarceration and the Liberal State 
Several different normative strands of liberalism all show that this level of 
caretaker incarceration perpetuates inequality. Liberal theories grapple with ideal equality 
and patrol the boundaries of permissible inequalities.64 An ideal account of fully realized 
equality is beyond the scope of the paper, but instead I draw on three different strands of 
liberalism that use different parameters to measure equality as well as opportunity: 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, Nussbaum’s theory of rights to certain 
capabilities, and Rawls’s primary goods theory. Together, they provide a cluster of 
different, but related, conceptions of what it is to enjoy “fair equality of opportunity.”65 
This central liberal tenet stands for the ideal “that every individual has an equal chance to 
live a life of her own choosing.”66 The incarceration of caretakers coupled with the 
“unchosen” and debilitating consequences of the incarceration on children are 
fundamentally incompatible with these theories of liberalism. 
The first strand of liberalism focuses on equality of resources and on 
responsibility. In Dworkin’s view, only when every citizen has a “fair” share of resources 
can each have a meaningful opportunity to choose their life plan. This theory 
distinguishes between a person’s choices, which we honor as a matter of respect, and the 
circumstances beyond their choosing, both of which affect the amount of resources a 
person commands.67 The theory explains that we as a society should hold people 
responsible for the consequences of their choices, the results of “option luck”, but not the 
consequences of their circumstances, the results of “brute luck.”68 Dworkin argues that 
some people face certain circumstances that are impossible to insure against and that it is 
profoundly unfair to hold individuals responsible for the results of those circumstances. 
Having one’s caretaker incarcerated is one example of brute luck. The negative outcomes 
correlated with parental incarceration discussed above69—childhood poverty, school 
failure, and mental health issues—mean that children whose parents are incarcerated do 
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not have the same opportunities as their peers, through no fault of their own. From an 
equality-of-resources view, it is unjust for some children to lose access to the basic 
developmental resources they need due to their brute luck. 
Another related theory focuses on capabilities and development of all persons. 
Martha Nussbaum explains that each person should have the right to certain central 
human capabilities, such as being able to reason practically, to have attachments to 
people and things, and to be treated as a dignified being.70 We can think of the rights to 
develop into an autonomous adult as one of these capabilities; such development is 
necessary in order to make use of resources. Anne Dailey takes this perspective, focusing 
on children’s development rights, the “opportunity to acquire the skills of adult 
autonomy.”71 She writes that children have the right to develop the “attributes of mind 
associated with the capacity for autonomous decision-making.”72 She reviews 
psychological literature and concludes that the capacity of autonomous choice—which 
includes the skills of cognitive thinking, emotional self-mastery, and strong reality-testing 
skills—is fostered by continuous care-giving.73 In this view, by removing the person who 
could provide such care, a society cripples the chances that these children will become 
fully autonomous adults because they will not possess the cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills they need to be effective decision-makers. Caretaker incarceration robs children of 
their ability to develop into independent adults by preventing them from developing the 
capabilities essential to function as autonomous adults. Thus, within a theoretical 
framework that cares about such capability development, caretaker incarceration is 
unjust. 
Finally, the problem of caretaker incarceration can be conceived of in terms of 
another liberal theory that concerns itself with primary goods. Rawls defines “primary 
goods” as “things . . . a rational [person] wants whatever else [that person] wants.”74 In 
other words, primary goods are things that a typical individual would desire regardless of 
their station in life. Elizabeth Brake conceives of “the social bases of caring 
relationships” as primary goods.75 As Brake explains, “[m]aterial caretaking for children 
is necessary for the development and exercise of their moral powers and pursuit of 
conceptions of the good. None of us would have moral powers, or conceptions to pursue, 
were it not for care as children.”76 The children of incarcerated caretakers are deprived of 
these caring relationships when their parents are removed from them. According to this 
view of liberalism, these children are therefore worse off, because they lack this primary 
good. 
The liberal state assigns important basic goods and opportunities through the 
family as an institution, with the state as a backdrop.77 Looking at the problem of 
caretaker incarceration through any of the three theories of liberalism—Dworkin’s 
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resource distribution view, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, or Rawls’s primary good 
framework—substantial, systematic, and discriminatory interventions such as caretaker 
incarceration deeply implicate the legitimacy of the liberal state by denying the children 
of incarcerated caretakers the same equality of opportunity as children who have not 
experienced caretaker incarceration. 
II. WHAT ARE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD? 
 Before we may consider the “interests” of children in decisions regarding their 
incarcerated or soon-to-be-incarcerated caretakers, we must first be able to identify these 
“interests.” This task cannot be completed without referring to the seemingly ubiquitous 
“best interests of the child standard” (BICS) of family law. Depending on the jurisdiction, 
BICS determinations typically take into account a variety of factors, such as the health 
and safety of the child and integrity of the family, to assess the type of judicial actions 
and assignments of responsibility that will best serve a child.78 The BICS has faced 
criticism since its inception, with its detractors claiming that it is arbitrary, value-laden, 
and unpredictable.79  
 Yet, even while promulgating a set of rules supposedly in opposition to the BICS, 
ALI acknowledged that “there is consensus that the law should seek to promote the 
child’s best interests.”80 BICS retains this consensus because it is not as much a standard 
as an ideal. In the fifty states, District of Columbia, and the American territories, courts 
are charged with making custody, adoption, and termination of parental rights decisions 
in the child’s best interest.81 As one scholar, who traced the history and evolution of the 
BICS noted, the BICS is “at once the most heralded, derided, and relied upon standard in 
family law today. It is heralded because it espouses the best and highest standard; it is 
derided because it is necessarily subjective; and it is relied upon because there is nothing 
better.”82 For practical purposes, BICS is the standard that courts predominantly use, and 
therefore, it is part of the existing framework that courts can build on to consider the 
rights of children of incarcerated caretakers. 
This Part first describes the general idea and implementation of the BICS. Next, it 
explores the criticisms of the BICS. Finally, it explores the application of the standard to 
children of incarcerated parents, concluding that some of its shortcomings are less salient 
in this context than in the traditional applications of the BICS to family law. In this 
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context as well as in family law, I conclude that we should strive to implement the best, 
most concrete form of the BICS rather than abandon it.83 
A. What Is the Best Interests of the Child Standard? 
Every American jurisdiction requires the use of some form of the BICS in a 
number of contexts: custody, placement or adoption, termination of parental rights, and 
other critical life issues affecting children.84 As the Child Welfare Information Gateway 
aptly summarizes in its review of the BICS statutes across America, there is no “standard 
definition” for the BICS, but such determinations are “generally made by considering a 
number of factors related to the circumstances of the child and the circumstances and 
capacity of the child’s potential caregiver(s), with the child’s ultimate safety and well-
being as the paramount concern.”85 Eighteen states and the District of Columbia list in 
their statutes specific factors for courts to consider in making determinations regarding 
the best interests of the child.86 These guidelines range from Maine’s exhaustive twenty-
two-factor list87 to Kentucky’s six-factor list.88 These factors are not weighted in 
importance. In some states, courts must consider all factors; in some states, courts may 
consider all factors; and in some states, courts may consider all other relevant factors. 
Twenty-six89 other states have what the Gateway calls “guiding principles of best interest 
determinations,” which range from the detailed to the perfunctory.90 The five remaining 
state statutes contain more general exhortations to consider the best interests of the child. 
With such disparate and varied tests, this ubiquitous standard lacks a clear meaning and 
requires refinement before application to the case of incarcerated caretakers. 
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B. The Best Interests of the Child Standard in the Context of Incarcerated Parents 
With the various standards discussed above, which BICS should be applied to 
incarcerated caretakers and parents? Certainly some iterations of the standard are better 
than others. The BICS is not perfect, and any “alternative” is simply a refined version of 
the core concept of the BICS. 
The BICS that should be used in the context of caretaker incarceration is the same 
BICS that should be used elsewhere: one that is a clear legal standard of effective and 
useful guidelines that also assigns weight to various factors and requires judges to 
articulate their determinations regarding each of them. It should explicitly grapple with 
issues of equality and evolving social science research, taking into account the entire 
network of care within which the child exists, while still being explicitly child-focused. 
Under this standard, the needs of children should be considered in two steps when 
a caretaker is facing incarceration. First, the court must ask if the person to be 
incarcerated is the child’s psychological parent. If so, the court must assess the child’s 
current living situation with the parent and compare it with the living situation the child 
would face if her caretaker were incarcerated. In the latter step, it is critical that the court 
distinguish the defendant’s offense from her ability to provide quality care for her child. 
1. Is the Person Incarcerated a “Psychological Parent”? 
In order to determine when to use the BICS standard discussed above, a court 
must determine whether the incarcerated person serves as a true caretaker to the child. 
One prominent conceptualization of who is really caring for a child is that of the 
“psychological parent,” which was pioneered by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and 
Joseph Solnit.91 A psychological parent is one who “on a continuing day-to-day basis 
through interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s psychological needs for a parent, as 
well as the child’s physical needs.”92 Based on this definition, many psychological 
parents may not be the biological or adoptive parents of these children. The focus on 
biological parents in family law often excludes those who truly care for children such as 
grandparents, step-parents, and same-sex partners.93 To more accurately reflect a child’s 
interests, we must more accurately focus on the systems of care-giving that exist in our 
society. This requires inquiry into “who does the caring work, who is in need of care, and 
how the needs of both groups may be provided for.”94 This starting point would shift 
much of the analysis regarding children away from status-based definitions of biological 
or adoptive parents and towards care-based definitions of psychological parents. If we are 
to recognize that “care and care-giving relationships are central to the lives of children, 
then this care should be clearly at the center of decisions—legal and political—about 
their lives.”95 Any real theory that accounts for the effects of incarceration on children 
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must identify these psychological parents and delineate the limits of who the law can 
recognize as giving care. 
It is essential that the law recognize more diverse family forms as the traditional 
nuclear family no longer reflects reality.96 For instance, the number of children under 18 
who are living with two married parents has declined from 87% to 64%.97 Almost 30% of 
children who live with at least one parent live with a parent who is divorced or has never 
been married.98 As the shape of the American family evolves, courts’ ideas of what 
constitutes a family must evolve as well. 
 Some courts have recognized non-biological or adoptive parents as parents using 
the psychological parent or de facto parent doctrine. A typical formulation of the 
psychological parent doctrine weighs four factors: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
[third party’s] formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship 
with the child; (2) that the [third party] and the child lived together in the 
same household; (3) that the [third party] assumed obligations of 
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, 
education and development, including contributing towards the child’s 
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the 
[third party] has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to 
have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental 
in nature.99 
 
Similarly, a de facto parent has been defined as an individual “who has no biological 
relation to the child, but has participated in the child’s life as a member of the child’s 
family,” who lives with the child, and who “with the consent and encouragement of the 
legal parent, perform[s] a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal 
parent.”100 It is encouraging that some courts, and legislatures, have recognized a non-
biological parent may function as a child’s primary caretaker and should therefore have 
standing in certain legal disputes.101 However, the doctrines have been very divisive and 
have not been adopted by most jurisdictions.102 Their uneven application puts children 
with incarcerated caretakers in jeopardy. 
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Beyond uneven application, these definitions are too narrow to cover all 
caretakers. Care does not only occur in nuclear families and does not only occur between 
children and parent-like adults. To be truly attuned to the needs of children, the law must 
begin to recognize networks of care. Professor Melissa Murray states that, “[t]his 
preoccupation with parenthood as the model for care-giving and the inability to recognize 
more broadly networks of care” leads to inaccurate understandings of the needs of 
children.103 The law cannot support the maintenance of care networks it does not 
recognize, however critical they are to the stability of a child’s life. 
A broader conception of “caretaker” leads to knotty challenges when applied. For 
example, a broad conception of caretaker requires us to consider such questions as 
whether a nanny for two children of very wealthy parents is the true psychological parent 
of a young child and whether a court should consider the effects of her incarceration in a 
bail or sentencing hearing. Similarly, if a child has many loving but unrelated adults who 
create a thick and supportive network of care, a broad conception of caretaker would 
require us to consider whether the effect on the child would not be legally cognizable if 
her mother were incarcerated because of the existence of this network. Some of these 
questions will be answered by creating a robust BICS. Some of these questions will have 
to be answered prudentially. For administrative reasons as well as the possibility of 
perverse incentives, not every adult who has close psychological ties with a child and 
who provides for her in some way would be able to claim the benefits of that relationship 
when facing incarceration. For the purposes of this paper, I must simply flag this issue 
and move forward—determining exactly what kinds of adults should be viewed as 
caretakers is an exercise beyond the scope of this paper. It is a worthy exercise, though, 
and we should be aware that however we choose to define caretaker or parent, we will 
certainly be over-inclusive and under-inclusive at different times.  
2. What is the Child’s Current Living Situation—and Future Options? 
In decisions affecting a caretaker facing incarceration, courts should assess the 
current situation of the child as well as the living situation the child faces in the event her 
caretaker is incarcerated. The best interests of children do not exist in a vacuum. As 
Goldstein and his co-authors point out, they live within a set of often less-than-ideal 
alternatives.104 Consequently, instead of comparing the living situation that children 
would face with each of their parents, courts must compare the situation that each child 
currently faces to the most realistic alternative. Factors such as “the stability of any 
proposed living arrangements of the child,” and “the motivation of the parties involved 
and their capacity to give the child love, affection, and guidance,” are necessary 
considerations for courts to realistically determine what is best for the child. At least one 
state has recognized the importance of these factors and has included both in their BICS 
statute.105 
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It is true that some children of incarcerated parents may potentially be in a better 
situation with their parents in detention, even if faced with foster care. The BICS in any 
context is supposed to help courts recognize harmful situations, not simply pick among 
good options. A parent who is not fit to parent is certainly no more fit to do so when 
faced with imminent incarceration. In fact, even though some studies have shown that 
parental incarceration is harmful to children, others also show that it can sometimes 
benefit children. 106 One study in particular showed that paternal incarceration does not 
harm children if the father has a history of domestic violence or is incarcerated for a 
violent offense.107 However, if the presence of a nonviolent offending caretaker can 
benefit children, many children may be harmed by parental incarceration. After all, many 
offenders are not arrested for violent crimes. In 2010, 52% of state prisoners and fewer 
than 10% of federal prisoners were incarcerated for a violent offense.108 Further, many of 
those imprisoned are first-time offenders and are not chronic offenders.109 Most 
caretakers, therefore, do not fall into the categories of violent or abusive offenders whose 
presence is detrimental to their children’s well-being.  
All this is to say that parents who have committed criminal offenses may still very 
well be fit parents, or at least their children would benefit from regular contact with them. 
Despite prevailing assumptions about criminality’s relation to parental fitness, the 
literature shows that many parents have good parent–child relationships with their 
children despite their criminal involvement.110 As such, when courts consider potential 
caretaker incarceration, they must accurately weigh the benefits provided by a caretaker 
against the real alternative living situation of the child. 
3. Grappling with Criticism 
As discussed above, many scholars have criticized the BICS for being arbitrary, 
unpredictable, and value-laden.111 However, when we look at the diversity of incarnations 
of the BICS, we see that the BICS is not a single concept implemented in a unitary way; 
rather, “the [BICS] standard merely means that the welfare of the child is of paramount 
concern to the court and ought to be to the parents as well.”112 Thus, the criticisms 
discussed below depend more or less on the legislation and case law surrounding a state’s 
use of the BICS.  
The salience of the criticisms of the BICS depends on context, and in the case of 
caretaker incarceration, many criticisms of the BICS are mitigated or simply do not 
apply. For example, the general presumption against state intrusion into family 
relationships for competence reasons is largely inapplicable here because the state has 
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already intruded through arrest and potential incarceration of the caretaker.113 In contrast 
to adoption or termination hearings, applying the BICS to caretaker incarceration could 
only serve to keep the family intact or more intact. Furthermore, unlike most cases 
involving the BICS, battles associated with parental incarceration are often more about 
access than custody. Although critics may rightfully be skeptical about the courts’ 
competence to choose between two fit parents, it is apparent to me that determining the 
degree of a child’s access to an incarcerated parent, whether in the form of less restrictive 
visitation policies or access to community correctional programs, does not raise the same 
issues. Once access is established, courts would defer to a child’s caretaker to determine 
if actual visitation was in the best interests of the individual child. 
Finally, in the context of parental incarceration, the best interests of the child are 
not to be paramount. The imperfect nature of the BICS is not as problematic when 
weighing a caretaker’s incarceration, as it is only to be one factor considered along with 
society’s other needs for retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.114 Part 
III will discuss in detail how a more robust BICS standard will balance with these other 
factors in the criminal justice system. 
III. WHAT COULD THE LAW DO? 
This Part explores three specific legal contexts in the criminal justice system in 
which a court may consider the best interests of an offender’s children at minimal cost, 
with considerable efficacy, and without substantially undermining retribution and 
punishment. Many criminologists and sociologists have advocated for criminal law to 
minimize the harm of caretaker incarceration, calling for the expansion of alternatives to 
incarceration (especially for women), an increase in prison nurseries, the lowering of 
sentences (especially for non-violent drug offenders), and the liberalization of prison 
visitation. 115 Each of these policies would alleviate some of the harmful effects of 
caretaker incarceration has on children. However, legal scholars have not examined what 
space there is in the current legal system for these changes and what such a legal regime 
would look like. I aim to do so here. 
Notably, this paper looks at these changes through a policy lens instead of through 
a constitutional lens. Some legal scholars advocate reaching similar ends by 
constitutionalizing children’s rights, arguing that a child’s right to a family should at 
times outweigh state interests in punishing parents.116 In this Part, I review the current 
state of the law on children’s rights and conclude that it is more pragmatic to broach the 
problem of the negative effects of caretaker incarceration on children through a policy 
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lens. Finally, I show that the law already takes third-party harms into account in a variety 
of different contexts, and thus, it is not a radical departure for it to do so in this context. 
However, courts must weigh these harms in an organized and principled way. 
A. A Criminal Justice System That Considers Children 
In order to imagine a criminal justice system that considers third-party effects on 
offenders’ children, we can look at existing systems. Some courts already consider family 
responsibilities in certain situations where parents are incarcerated,117 while others 
completely ignore them.118 Even in the scenarios where family responsibilities are taken 
into account, the responsibilities are taken into account inconsistently between 
jurisdictions, and even between judges in the same jurisdictions. Further, caretaking 
responsibilities are most often viewed from the point of view of a parent’s functions, 
rather than her children’s needs.119  
This Part argues that there is room in the law to take the best interests of children 
into account in a consistent, structured way at many points within our legal system. Here, 
I focus on three scenarios—pretrial detention, sentencing, and prison visitation—to show 
that when a parent is incarcerated, her children’s interests are taken into account 
haphazardly, and there is plenty of potential for courts to consider these children’s 
interests in a more substantive manner. Each of these scenarios involves a judicially- or 
legislatively- created multi-factor test that can be amended to include the best interests of 
the children of the individual facing incarceration. This additional factor should not be 
the sole probative factor, but it must be systematically and uniformly considered by 
courts. These tests would structure existing discretion in a more systematic and 
transparent way. Prosecutors and judges currently have some informal discretion to take 
children’s interests into account. Formally taking into account children’s interests is 
fundamentally outside the traditional norms of prosecutors and judges, which emphasize 
individual culpability and de-emphasize third-party interests. The proposals set forth in 
this Part would formalize consideration of these interests and would authorize 
prosecutors and judges to investigate individual families to obtain the information they 
need to make valid decisions in the best interests of these children. 
1. Pretrial Detention 
Pretrial detention hearings present an initial phase in which caretakers are 
separated from their children without systematized consideration of their children’s 
interests. When an individual is arrested, the court must decide if and at what dollar 
amount to set bail for that individual to be released before trial. In federal court, a judge 
must order pretrial release on the defendant’s recognizance or unsecured bond unless that 
judge “determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”120 
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If the judge determines that the defendant is a flight risk or a danger to the community, 
the judge will order the defendant released “subject to the least restrictive further 
condition, or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will 
reasonably assure” such appearance or community safety.121 Sometimes the least 
restrictive condition will be no release at all, or preventive detention. The federal statute 
states that the judge should consider available information regarding “family ties” as one 
of many factors to determine the appropriate conditions for pretrial release.122  
Many states require similar determinations regarding flight risk and the danger the 
defendant poses to others,123 and also require that judges consider family ties when 
making bail determinations.124 Even if these statutes were employed in every jurisdiction, 
which they currently are not, they are far from ideal. Most fundamentally, these statutes 
allow the consideration of family ties only insofar as they relate to a defendant’s flight 
risk or the danger the defendant presents to society rather than as they relate to the best 
interests of the child. While a child’s interests should not be the sole determining factor, 
they are a factor that must be considered. If a defendant’s flight risk is high, or if the 
defendant presents a substantial danger to the community, the child’s interests are 
subsumed by society’s interest in confining the defendant and protecting the public. 
However, we cannot reach this balancing test under the current regime. The adult-centric 
view of family responsibilities refuses to account for the interests of children.  
In sum, under our current law, the decision whether or not to grant bail is a two-
factor inquiry—it requires a determination of the defendant’s: (1) flight risk and (2) 
danger to the community. To truly minimize the harm a child may suffer when her 
parents are incarcerated, the existing test must be amended to include a third factor: the 
child’s best interests. This is simple enough to do, theoretically if not politically, because 
these two factors are legislatively created rather than constitutionally mandated. The 
history of the federal bail statute further illustrates the malleability of these factors. 
Prior to 1984, federal judges were only allowed to consider flight risk when 
making bail determinations.125 In 1984, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act which 
allowed a judge to impose preventive detention if the defendant posed a danger to the 
community.126 In United States v. Salerno, a defendant challenged the constitutionality of 
this statute claiming that the purpose of imposing bail and other release conditions is to 
ensure that the defendant appears in court when required, not to punish or prejudge the 
merits of the case.127 The Supreme Court held that “[n]othing in the text of the Bail 
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Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to questions of flight,” and 
the prevention of violence was a “compelling interest” that Congress could mandate 
judges to consider when setting bail.128 
Using the same reasoning, there are many compelling state interests that would 
allow Congress to mandate that judges consider the best interests of the child of a 
defendant caretaker when setting bail. The Court has previously held that the state “has 
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”129 It has also recognized that the 
state has an interest to see that children are given opportunities for “growth into free and 
independent well-developed men and citizens.”130 Congress could certainly find that the 
incarceration of caretakers negatively affects both the current well-being of children and 
their futures as developed citizens—there is compelling evidence that this is the case, as I 
argued in Part I.  
 The best interests of the child should be added as a factor that judges must 
consider when setting a dollar amount for bail. This requirement would codify and make 
more consistent a practice that is already taking place, either under the guise of “family 
ties” that reduce a defendant’s flight risks or due to the sympathies of judges, prosecutors, 
or other actors in the system. Requiring systemized consideration of the best interests of 
the children of offenders would also force actors to gather more information about 
offenders and their families. Judges who must obtain accurate information about 
offenders’ caretaking responsibilities can make sentencing determinations that take into 
account these obligations. 
Additionally, there is no reason to believe that this factor would necessarily be at 
odds with the other two. A defendant who is the sole supporter of her children is less 
likely to pose a flight risk. An alleged serial killer who poses grave danger to the 
community most likely should not be at home with her children. This balancing test is 
where a robust BICS, discussed in Part II, that recognizes children are sometimes better 
off without their parent would play an important role. Such a standard would also require 
a deeper understanding of who actually is a caretaker. The incarceration of a biological 
father who has no relationship with his children and does not support them in any way 
would not have much, if any, effect on his children. In that situation, the BICS factor may 
have almost no weight. On the other hand, when determining bail for a same-sex partner 
of a child’s biological mother who cares for her partner’s biological children and her 
ailing partner, the best interests of the children she is providing care for should be taken 
into account.  
We can take a look at the effects of this change by returning to Mary. In the 
second version of this story, Mary is presented at arraignment in a state that has altered 
the traditional balancing test to take Mary’s children into account. The magistrate who 
determines bail considers: (1) her future dangerousness; (2) the flight risk she presents; 
and (3) the best interests of her children, as defined by a scientifically-informed, class- 
and race-sensitive BICS that lists numerous, specific factors and the weight each should 
be accorded. She is released subject to a manageable amount of bail and is able to 
continue providing care for her children while awaiting the outcome of her case. 
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Traditional sentencing determinations look very much like bail determinations. 
Within defined parameters, a judge must make an individualized assessment of what 
amount of time a defendant should spend in jail. Just as in bail determinations, sentencing 
schemes vary among the fifty states and the federal government.131 The Supreme Court 
has long recognized that sentencing must involve an individualized assessment in front of 
a judge with broad discretion, that “justice generally requires consideration of more than 
the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account 
the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the 
offender.”132 The move from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing over the 
last few decades sought to minimize judges’ discretion, and therefore disparity, in 
sentencing.133 The tools of this movement include mandatory minimums, three-strikes 
laws, and sentencing guidelines. However, at least thirty-two states still have some form 
of an indeterminate sentencing scheme.134  
Even in determinate sentencing jurisdictions, there is generally room for 
discretion, as illustrated by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although these guidelines 
have been advisory since 2005, they are still influential—only 2.4% of federal sentences 
given in 2010 departed from the guidelines range.135 Within the range suggested by the 
guidelines, a judge must sentence an offender based on “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” as well as “the need for 
the sentence imposed,” which contemplates the four traditional goals of sentencing: 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.136 The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual encourages judges to take offenders’ characteristics into account 
through their criminal history and other related factors.137 The Guidelines must, by 
statute, reflect the “general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational 
skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the 
defendant.”138 Before the Guidelines were rendered advisory, one judge wrote that this 
provision “is so cruelly delusive as to make those who have to apply the guidelines to 
human beings, families, and the community want to weep.”139 Despite the 
discouragement of the Federal Sentencing Commission and Congress, federal judges 
since 2005 have been able to take into account family ties among other factors.140 In 
2010, 5.2% of departures downwards from the Guidelines were made because of family 
ties, and 0.2% of total sentences departed downwards from the Guidelines because of 
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family ties.141 Thus, judges are able to use some discretion to include a child’s best 
interests, even within a more determinate sentencing framework. 
The current state of the law on sentencing creates similar problems as the current 
state of the law on bail. First, a concern for family ties is not employed in every 
jurisdiction. Second, even in jurisdictions that consider family ties as a factor, they are 
considered inconsistently. Eight states expressly permit consideration of family ties and 
responsibilities in sentencing,142 but these states do not uniformly apply these factors.143 
Judicial discretion and indeterminate sentencing schemes may yield disparate results in 
sentencing. Third, judges only consider “family ties” from the adult’s point of view. 
Currently, an offender without a monetary or legal tie to the dependent—such as a non-
guardian grandparent who provides childcare but does not contribute to the household 
income—would not have grounds to argue for mitigation based on family ties in some 
courts.144 It is for this reason that judges should consider the best interests of the child 
rather than family ties. Whether an offender has a “tie” to a child is not determinative of 
whether that child would be better off with the offender in their home. As with bail 
determinations, there is a simple way to fix the current state of sentencing: mandate that 
judges consider the best interests of any children for which the offender is the caretaker 
when deciding upon a sentence. As with bail, this factor should not be determinative. But 
it must be considered systematically for each offender, in front of each judge, in each 
courtroom, and guided by a uniform standard that channels the judge’s discretion. 
Requiring judges to consider family ties in sentencing would not solve much of 
the problem of mandating consideration of the best interests of the children affected, 
because in many jurisdictions, prosecutors rather than judges carry out sentencing. In 
these jurisdictions, such considerations would need to occur in the prosecutors’ offices. 
Plea bargains—which are the source of ninety-four percent of convictions145—often 
come with a sentence recommended or even guaranteed by the prosecutor. Sentencing 
guidelines or statutes that mandate judges consider the best interests of the child in 
sentencing would therefore have little force in the vast majority of cases. It would 
probably be best if a third party assessed the best interests of the children in a report 
given to every prosecutor before a final plea bargain is reached. Guardians ad litem or 
court-appointed social workers would be likely candidates to fulfill this role. In some 
jurisdictions, there are officials, unrelated to the prosecution, who prepare reports before 
sentencing.146 In those jurisdictions, states could easily mandate these officials to include 
findings regarding the best interests of any children for which the defendant credibly 
claims that she is a caretaker. 
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What happens to Mary at sentencing in a state that has modified its sentencing 
scheme as suggested in this section? At sentencing, the judge explicitly considers: (1) the 
nature and circumstances of Mary’s offense, her history, and characteristics, including 
criminal history and acceptance of responsibility; (2) the need for the sentence imposed 
as relates to the traditional goals of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation; and (3) the best interests of her children and the effect sentences within the 
appropriate range will have on them. Mary is sentenced on the lower end of the range of 
applicable punishments and made eligible for parole relatively quickly. Because of the 
relatively short time of her incarceration, a cousin of hers will be able to care for her 
children. She will not be in jail for long enough that the state must move to terminate her 
parental rights and therefore her children will only experience a brief break in the care 
they have received from their mother for their whole lives. 
3. A Note on Discretion 
One obvious criticism of mandating judges to consider the best interests of 
children at sentencing and bail determinations is that this would afford judges the 
opportunity to exercise too much discretion. However, as the discussion above highlights 
and as many scholars have pointed out,147 judges and prosecutors possess extraordinary 
amounts of discretion. Even the basic determination of who presents a flight risk, which 
is an accepted role of a judge in setting bail, requires judges to use their discretion to 
make an educated prediction. The Court’s rejection of mandatory sentencing guidelines 
in Booker was an affirmation of “the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in 
imposing a sentence” limited only by a statutory range.148  
All this is to say that judges already use discretion in every bail and sentencing 
determination. This proposal would bring to light what is most likely occurring sub rosa, 
standardize what is occurring in a myriad of different ways, and guide discretion through 
the use of a robust and psychologically attuned BICS. It is true that such a system would 
not eliminate judges’ often-biased discretion, but a system with such discretion currently 
exists and will likely remain. We should harness that existing system to mandate the 
consideration of the real interests of the children left behind by real incarcerated 
caretakers. In fact, the lack of judicial discretion that does exist in some states due to 
especially rigid sentencing guidelines and statutes has been criticized by many scholars 
and judges.149 Especially salient among these criticisms, for the purposes of this paper, is 
that such a policy renders invisible the children of incarcerated caretakers and makes it 
impossible for the law to recognize the tangible harm caretaker incarceration may bring 
to the child and to society as a whole. 
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Once a caretaker is sentenced, the criminal justice system should consider 
whether the best interest of a child requires regular visits with the caretaker. Prison 
visitation policies vary wildly between and within jurisdictions, and tracking these 
differences would be beyond the scope of this paper.150 What is important for the 
purposes of this Part, however, is that courts rarely intrude on decisions made by prison 
officials regarding visitation polices. In the landmark case Turner v. Safley, the Court 
held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 151 There 
are four prongs in that inquiry: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between 
the prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) 
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) the impact that 
accommodation of the constitutional right will have on guards, other inmates, or the 
allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there are ready alternatives to the 
regulation.152 The Turner test is incredibly difficult for prisoners to overcome and leads 
to some very troubling outcomes, including in the visitation context. For instance, in 
Overton v. Bazzetta, the Court held that prison regulations that did not allow visits to any 
minor nieces and nephews whose parental rights had been terminated, prohibited inmates 
from visiting other inmates, required children to be accompanied by a family member or 
legal guardian when visiting, and banned inmates with two substance-abuse violations 
from future visitation for up to two years, all passed the Turner test.153  
The interests of children are conspicuously absent in the Turner analysis. One 
way to address this would be to modify the interpretation of Turner’s first factor. In 
Overton, the Court recognized a state interest of maintaining security and “protecting 
child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or accidental injury.”154 
Notably, this was the only mention of children in the entire decision. As discussed above, 
a state also has an interest in the well-being of its children. In cases concerning visitation 
and other prison policies that impact children, this interest should be discussed in the first 
factor. Once it is clear that the policy works against that specific state interest, the fourth 
prong should address whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation. This would 
require an inquiry into whether prisoners’ rights could be better accommodated and 
whether the state’s interest in the well-being of its children could be better 
accommodated. 
More radically, the Supreme Court could modify the traditional Turner test when 
policies that implicate the interests of children are being considered. In its modified form, 
courts would consider three interests: the interests of prison administrators, prisoners, and 
their children. The interests of the children of incarcerated caretakers need not have equal 
weight to the other two categories; each jurisdiction could decide how to best balance 
each of these interests. This formulation likely constitutes the best process. It squarely 
addresses the independent needs and interests of children without subsuming them to 
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those of adults, be they prison administrators or their own parents. Turner is simply a 
judicially crafted balancing test, and the Court could modify it as easily as it created it. 
However, given the current state of prison litigation and children’s rights jurisprudence, 
this move is highly unlikely.155  
Mary’s story is impacted by the modification of the Turner test as well as by the 
more expansive understanding of who a caretaker is. Regardless of the composition of 
Mary’s family, its members are allowed the same visitation rights as more “traditional” 
family members. When the jail administrators are considering a new restrictive visitation 
policy as a way to discipline Mary, they would consider: (1) their own interest in prison 
discipline and safety; (2) the other inmates’ interests in visitation with their families; and 
(3) the children’s interests in maintaining a relationship with their incarcerated parents. In 
some cases, the administrators could still decide that limiting visitation is the only 
appropriate disciplinary tool in their arsenal.  
B. The Sad State of Children’s Constitutional Rights 
At first glance, the field of constitutional rights may seem like a fruitful avenue to 
secure the rights of children of caretakers subject to incarceration. Children’s rights 
scholars Anne C. Dailey and Chesa Boudin recently argued that the rights of incarcerated 
caretakers derive from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and First 
Amendment associational rights.156 But in light of recent trends in children’s and parents’ 
rights jurisprudence and the natural vagueness of such constitutional rights, the 
foundation of any real rights must inevitably become a discussion of legislative and 
administrative policy, rather than one of judicial lawmaking.157 First, given the 
unfortunate current state of parents’ and children’s rights jurisprudence, an affirmative 
recognition of the rights of children would require an almost seismic shift in the attitudes 
of the courts. For this reason, I believe that pushing for recognition of children’s rights in 
prudentially-created balancing tests is a course of action more likely to succeed. Second, 
even if the Court were to find affirmative rights for children, the Court would need to 
clearly articulate these rights, give them content, and defend them. The judiciary and 
legislature would have to create new tests and standards, as well as modify already 
existing ones. Therefore, the work in this paper is still vital.  
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Despite recognition by some courts of children’s constitutional rights, modern 
jurisprudence involving determinations of the care of children inexplicably ignores 
children’s rights. Courts have found that children have some rights in the contexts of 
avoiding involuntary confinement,158 criminal proceedings,159 and the First160 and Fourth 
Amendments;161 though these rights are more limited than those the Court recognizes for 
adults. The Court has recognized robust rights of parental autonomy and the state’s 
interest in caring for its children, but “[d]espite the concern for children's ‘best interests,’ 
the parameters of legal discourse have been based on parents’ rights to their children 
instead of on a child’s right to be parented.”162  
The Court has had many opportunities to expand children's constitutional rights 
when dealing with children's welfare and has repeatedly failed to do so. Three canonical 
cases illustrate this trend. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,163 the Court found unconstitutional a 
statute compelling all students to attend formal high school until age sixteen.164 As 
Justice Douglas noted in his dissent, the majority viewed the only interests at stake as 
those of the parents and those of the state; the interests of the children were disregarded 
entirely.165 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court found unconstitutional a Washington statute 
that allowed any person to petition for visitation rights and that allowed the court to grant 
these visitation rights if a court determined they were in the best interests of the children 
involved.166 The Supreme Court found that an order allowing visitation by the paternal 
grandparents of children who lived with their mother was an unconstitutional 
infringement on the mother’s rights, regardless of the Washington court’s findings 
regarding the children’s best interests. Most infamous and tragic is DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County, in which the Court held that the state had no duty to protect a child 
from parental abuse even when authorities had been alerted to the abuse, and the lack of 
intervention ultimately led to the child’s death.167 These cases are landmarks in a line of 
jurisprudence that sees cases that involve children as involving only the interests of the 
parents that control them.  
The Court's decisions in these cases exemplify a judicial unwillingness to expand 
the constitutional rights of children, foreclosing this potentially fruitful path. Out of this 
jurisprudence, it does not seem possible that the Court will find a constitutionally 
protected right to “maintain primary care-giving relationships”168 or to a “family 
relationship.”169 As much as children’s advocates would like to see those rights given 
effect, I believe it is much more practicable to press for a robust form of the best interests 
of the child inquiry to be included as a factor in decisions that weigh the interests of 
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parents, the state, and private actors, but do not acknowledge the interests of the children 
involved. Further, were the Court to recognize the constitutional status of such interests, 
it would still have to make these rights concrete through the balancing test or legislative 
change this paper seeks to describe. 
C. Third-Party Harms and the Purposes of Punishment 
Taking children’s interests into account in caretaker incarceration requires the 
consideration of third-party harms in the criminal justice system, consideration that is 
traditionally thought of as outside the scope of this system. The criminal justice system is 
generally conceived of as serving the traditional retributive and utilitarian purposes of 
punishment. Retributive justifications focus on just deserts and forfeiture of rights 
proportional to the crime committed. Utilitarian justifications focus on deterrence of the 
offender, incapacitation of the offender, and rehabilitation of the offender.170 All of these 
ends are met by focusing on the characteristics of the offender and the offense he 
committed. Related to these goals is the goal of uniformity in the administration of the 
criminal justice system.171 The axiom that similarly situated defendants should receive 
similar sentences drove the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.172 For 
these reasons, taking third-party harms into account seems, at first blush, contrary to the 
aims of the criminal justice system. However, I demonstrate in this Part that: (1) criminal 
law should adopt a more robust definition of which defendants are similarly situated; and 
(2) our criminal justice system already takes into account third-party harms in a variety of 
contexts.  
First, a more robust idea of what it means for defendants to truly be similarly 
situated, and therefore be treated equally, allows us to take into account the interests of 
the children of incarcerated caretakers without violating the equality principle. One 
widely cited case to show the injustice of taking third-party harms into account is United 
States v. Johnson.173 In Johnson, two female co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy, 
bribery, and theft of public money. Although they were convicted for the same crimes, 
Cheryl Purvis received a sentence of twenty-seven months in prison followed by two 
years of supervised release,174 while Cynthia Johnson received six months of home 
detention followed by three years of supervised release. The reason for the difference was 
the ten downward level departures from the Sentencing Guidelines that Johnson received 
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for “extraordinary family circumstances.” Johnson was “solely responsible” for care of 
four children: her own three young children, including one infant, as well as the young 
child of her institutionalized daughter.175 Although some argue that this story is a prime 
example of a judge breaking the cardinal rule that similarly situated person should be 
treated similarly,176 this mindset requires a limited definition of “similarly situated” 
defendants. The story of Cynthia Johnson and Cheryl Purvis is a story about two women 
who were not similarly situated, despite having committed the same crime together. They 
were dissimilarly situated in their caretaking responsibilities—Johnson was a fit177 and 
irreplaceable provider of care to four very young and vulnerable children.178 
Even if one does not accept the dissimilarity of caretaker and non-caretaker 
offenders, third-party harms are already a part of our criminal justice system, from areas 
as disparate as prosecutorial discretion in corporate crime to victim-impact statements in 
sentencing hearings. In fact, when creating the Sentence Guidelines, the Sentencing 
Commission was required to take into account the deterrent effect of a punishment on the 
offender, but also the possible deterrent effect on other future offenders.179 This, of 
course, evinces a concern for multiple third parties: future offenders and future victims.180 
As outlined above, family ties—often viewed as familial responsibilities—are already 
taken into account in bail and sentencing decisions.181 Currently, determinations 
regarding parole, furlough, and alternatives to incarceration may also involve 
considerations of a defendant’s family responsibilities. Standardizing the way they are 
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considered instead of having wild discrepancies between and within jurisdictions will 
give the criminal justice system more legitimacy, not less.  
Additionally, third parties related to victims often play a large role in the criminal 
justice system. For instance, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that it was 
constitutional to allow victim-impact statements which highlight the “impact of the 
murder on the victim’s family” in the sentencing phase of capital cases. 182 Although one 
surely can, and the Court in fact did, conceive of the family of the victim and society 
itself as victims in a homicide, they are not the direct victims. Giving a harsher sentence 
to a murderer because of the impact his crime had on the victim’s small children is no 
different in kind than giving a more lenient sentence to a drug dealer because of the 
impact a long jail sentence would have on the offender’s small children. Just as society 
suffers when it loses a productive and beloved member to homicide, it likewise suffers 
when the child of an incarcerated parent is sent into foster care and faces ruined life 
opportunities.183 
Other considerations unrelated to the offender and his direct victims are also often 
considered in criminal law. Darryl Brown catalogues the myriad ways that criminal law 
takes into account third-party harms.184 He points to a 1996 memo from Eric Holder, the 
Deputy Attorney General at the time, to all United States Attorneys that empowered them 
“to consider the collateral consequences of a corporate criminal conviction in 
determining whether to charge the corporation with a criminal offense.”185 Further, as 
Robinson and Cahill show, there are a number of doctrines and practices that prevent 
punishment of the culpable, including witness immunity, statutes of limitation, resource 
limits, and exclusionary rules.186 To this I would add the political and personal 
aspirations of prosecutors and the cultures in their offices, which many scholars have 
noticed is a driving force in charging and sentencing procedures in some offices.187 These 
practices do not constitute consideration of third-party harms, but they certainly do 
constitute consideration of goals other than the four traditional goals of punishment.  
In short, the criminal justice system currently accounts for third-party harms, and 
considerations other than retribution, deterrence, culpability, and rehabilitation often 
control decisions made in the system. Given that the system takes effects on third-parties 
into account, traditional retributivist and deterrence theories, even those that consider 
general deterrence, no longer adequately explain or justify our practices of punishment. 
As it stands, the system already considers more than the culpability of the offender and 
his dangerousness. As Brown says, “giving third-party interests a greater role complicates 
the calculus but hardly calls for a departure from established criminal law practices. It 
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calls only for a departure from traditional theories that inadequately describe practice.”188 
This lack of an adequate theory to explain what goes on in our criminal justice system 
and the inconsistent and highly discretionary way in which third-party harms are 
currently taken into account is what undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system.  
 Brown is correct in saying that “what we need are broader theories of criminal 
justice, of which punishment theory is only a part, and which situates criminal law as one 
tool in a larger social policy.”189 The discussion above is simply to highlight that 
accounting for the best interests of children would not be a departure from the real 
practice in the criminal justice system that already takes into account third-party harms in 
a variety of contexts. Nor does taking their interests into account undermine the 
traditional theories that explain punishment, because these theories have already been 
undermined by practice. Thus, though there is room to argue about the wisdom of taking 
into account any third-party harms, the statist argument—that the criminal justice system 
should not do so because it never has done so and therefore never should—is simply 
inaccurate. 
CONCLUSION – REVISITING MARY 
Mary, the loving primary caretaker of three children, is arrested on the same drug 
charges. This time, however, she is arrested in a state that has implemented all of the 
suggestions put forth in this paper. Mary is able to make bail while awaiting the 
disposition of her case, enabling her to continue supporting her family before she pleads 
guilty and giving her time to prepare her family for the upcoming transition when she is 
incarcerated. Next, Mary receives a sentence at the lower end of the possible range, 
allowing her to leave her children in a family member’s care without unduly burdening 
her or risking the termination of her parental rights. While she is in jail, her children are 
able to visit her regularly due to visitation policies that do not revoke such privileges 
arbitrarily or as a disproportionate response to minor disciplinary infractions. At each 
step along this way, Mary’s gender, the gender of her partner, and the biological 
relationship she may or may not have with the children she cares for are not at issue. The 
only issue in determining the best interests of these children is what sort of care she 
provides for them. 
Mary’s story, retold subject to the proposals in this paper, should highlight how 
easy it would be to take children’s needs into account when incarcerating their caretakers. 
Such consideration fits easily into the determinations that judges, legislators, and prison 
administrators make on a regular basis—determinations in which these actors already use 
their discretion and balance different priorities. The proposals in this paper are in no way 
a radical departure from existing practice. They simply reorient current policies, 
articulating instincts that are already in play in many jurisdictions and standardizing the 
inconsistent way these instincts about justice and harm are currently being taken into 
account.  
The ideas that animate this paper could be expanded in a number of other contexts 
in the criminal justice system. The availability of alternatives to incarceration, prison 
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nurseries, release on parole, the locations of prisons, and the choice of which prison an 
offender is sentenced to all implicate the interests of the children of incarcerated 
offenders. Even outside of the criminal justice system, caretakers are being incarcerated, 
thereby losing their civil rights to function as parents, without consideration of their 
children’s interests. For instance, in 2011, the Court decided in Turner v. Rogers, that 
there is no right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding, even in the case of an indigent 
noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order and faces incarceration for up 
to a year.190 In these situations, as in the contexts that make up the bulk of this paper, the 
formulae being used are missing a critical variable: the interests of the children of 
incarcerated caretakers. Therefore, the formula must be changed.  
It is necessary to start acknowledging the harm that one generation of 
incarceration imposes on the next generation. It is necessary to start taking these harms 
into account because we have to stop victimizing the most vulnerable of our children and 
ensure that all of our children have some degree of equality in their life chances. It is 
necessary and it is possible to do so. This paper sought to illustrate one way in which 
taking the interests of children into account could be done. My hope is that it will spur 
more creative thinking regarding other contexts in which courts should consider 
children’s interests as well as regarding other relevant relationships of care. However it is 
done, it is time that the law recognizes the harm mass incarceration inflicts both on the 
people behind bars as well as those who depend on them. 
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